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Abstract 
According to the literature, two main factors sparked the European debt crisis: (1) macroeconomic imbalances originated by 
national governments and (2) institutional design flaws leading to feeble response by European authorities; still, economists 
disagree on the factors' strength. Using Bai and Perron's technique, we contribute to the debate by identifying break dates in 
Greece, Italy and Spain daily values of 10-year public bonds’ interest rates and link them to key political and institutional 
events. Also, employing GARCH and EGARCH models, we investigate how interest rates spreads' volatility reacted to 
crucial and long-lasting events. Our results uncover the following facts about the crisis: a) it began in May 2010, while the 
first aid programme for Greece was approved; b) worsened after summer 2011, as the European authorities hastened 
restructuring the Greek sovereign debt; c) improved only during summer 2012, when the ECB Governing Council approved 
a programme for the purchase of sovereign bonds. On the whole, our results point at institutional failures as the main cause 
of the European debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists debating the European debt crisis tend to agree that interest rates respond to market information 
and adjust to key news. They would allow that studying how the rates change alongside major economic and 
political events can hint at the proximate causes of the crisis. 
 
Figure 01 – Secondary market yields of government bonds with maturity closed to ten years (2006 – 2014, June) 
(percentages per annum, daily values) 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by examining the daily values of 10-year government 
bonds’ interest rates of Greece, Italy and Spain, which have undergone dramatic changes in recent years due to 
speculative attacks (Figure 1). We present an econometric analysis based on the Bai and Perron (1998) method 
to identify break dates in the time series of the sovereign bonds’ interest rates. Moreover, to take into account 
that the events of the period considered may have produced long-lasting effects and changes in the volatility of 
bond yields, we also investigate the variability of the spread between the 10-year German Bund by estimating a 
GARCH and an EGARCH model. We then use the econometric results obtained to propose an interpretation of 
the causes of the European debt crisis. Break dates and changes in yields’ volatility are so employed to identify 
some important triggering events. The results will support an interpretation of the European debt crisis that 
considers as main cause the defects of the institutional organization of the monetary union. 
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At the cost of some simplification one can say that when economists discuss the causes of financial 
crises, they tend to identify two main causes: macroeconomic imbalances (MIs) and institutional 
failures (IFs). The debate's sides concede that both motives play some role but they question their 
relative strengths.
1
 The participants in the dispute on the causes of the European debt crisis too 
acknowledge that both macroeconomic imbalances and the flaws in the institutional organization have 
affected the movements of the interest rates. Yet, they interpret the influence of these elements in 
different ways and consequently propose alternative policy solutions. The diversity of positions often 
reflects dissimilar degrees of confidence in the capacity of the price mechanism to restore efficient 
equilibrium conditions and in the ability of financial markets to correctly evaluate the risk originated by 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
A first interpretation of the causes of the European debt crisis attributes the main role to the 
mistaken choices of the governments of the countries under attack. Although it acknowledges the 
existence of nontrivial differences among their fundamentals (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2011, 2012), 
this interpretation maintains that the crisis hit countries where labour unions are strong and 
governments and central banks are weak. The high wage rates imposed by the unions raised prices and 
generated deficits in the current account of the balance of payments (Rother et al. 2010; Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser 2011, 2012). The international capital markets, unable to price the implicit risks, 
funded these deficits before 2007, but the crisis led the markets to correct the mispricing. The interest 
rates paid by the countries with strong labour unions rose, heading to a stop of funds coming from 
abroad and to the debt crisis, which, for these authors, started in autumn 2009 when the newly elected 
Greek government revealed that the public deficits were higher than previously announced (Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser 2011, p. 19; Honkapohja 2014).
2
 Mistrusting the upright behaviour of the national 
authorities and confiding in the working of the price mechanism, these authors propose austerity 
                                                 
1
 The increased frequency of financial crisis over recent decades (Laeven and Valencia 2008) has enhanced a literature on 
this issue, which proposes three generations of models. The “first generation models” focus on the role of macroeconomic 
imbalances (Salant and Henderson 1978; Krugman 1979; Flood and Garber 1984). They provide the theoretical background 
from which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) drew its policies for the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. The 
“second-generation models” focus on the possibility that the crises occur because the operators believe that it is going to 
happen because, for instance, the authorities are unable to control speculative movements (Obstfeld 1994; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart 1999; Goldfajn and Valdés 1997; Chang and Velasco 2000; Sarno and Taylor 2002; Buiter 2007). The events 
concerning the speculative attacks against the European Monetary System in 1992 and the Mexican and the Asiatic crises in 
1994 and 1997 stimulated them. The “third-generation models” underline the role of news that change the views of financial 
operators on the quality of specific debts (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002; Kamisky et al. 2003; Kaminsky et al. 2009; 
Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). 
2
 Fahrolz and Freytag (2012, pp. 79-80) also refer to two subsequent dates that have negatively marked the evolution of the 
crisis. These are July and October 2011, when in two subsequent EU summits the rescue packages were substantially 
broadened to include a debt reduction, a second round of bailout loans by IMF and the EU and a release of European 
structural funds to assist the Greek economy. 
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measures, severe penalties for misaligned national behaviours and labour markets’ reforms to come out 
of the distress. 
A second interpretation considers that the flaws in the institutional organization are the major cause of the 
crisis. The existence of macroeconomic imbalances and of mistakes in the national policies is not denied. Yet, 
the crisis began when financial operators realised that the flaws in the institutional organization would have 
prevented the European institutions from playing the role for which they had been created, i.e. to defend the 
economies and the citizens from the instability of the international financial markets. 
There is some diversification within the literature proposing this second interpretation related to the flaw of 
the institutional setting that is considered the most important. Before and after the financial crisis of 2007 this 
literature has identified several related flaws and some gaps and contradictions in the Treaties of the Union
3
, 
which the European authorities have been unable to eliminate. 
Among the weaknesses in the institutional organization this literature has underlined 
 the obstacles set to the central bank in guaranteeing the smooth working of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy; 
 the inability to guarantee a satisfactory solution to the moral hazard problem in the behaviour of the national 
fiscal authorities; 
 the inability to deal with asymmetric tendencies within the area; 
 the inability to limit the space for national conflicts in the solution of problems. 
According to some authors (see De Grauwe, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2012; Kopf 2011; Valiante, 2011), the 
European debt crisis began because the European Central Bank (ECB) failed to play the role of lender of last 
resort in the sovereign bond markets, a role that other central banks, like that of Japan, UK and USA, perform.
4
 
According to De Grauwe (2011b), this event occurred in Spring 2010. Those holding this position recognise that 
movements of fear and panic can drive the spreads away from the underlying fundamentals (De Grauwe, 2012; 
Gros 2012; De Grauwe and Ji 2014; Gerner-Beuerle et al. 2014). 
For other authors (Wyplosz 2010, 2011; 2013b; Buiter and Rahbari, 2012), the ECB could not act as lender of 
last resort in the sovereign bond markets because policy coordination had yet to be re-organised to minimise the 
moral hazard regarding the behaviour of the national fiscal authorities. 
Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2003) also clarified that policy coordination in EMU eliminates discretion by 
establishing rigid fiscal rules that ignore differences among the economies. It follows a “restricted approach”, 
                                                 
3
 Art. 105.2, which attributes to the Eurosystem the task of guaranteeing the smooth working of the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy, can come in contradiction with Art. 123 that forbids the direct purchase of sovereign bonds and the 
bailout of national governments. Art. 125.1, which claims that euro countries cannot guarantee the sovereign debt of another 
member state, can contradict Art. 122.2, which states that countries threatened by severe difficulties can receive assistance 
by other Union members. 
4
 Since they issued their government debt in dollars, Latin American countries lacked a central bank stabilising the 
sovereign debt markets. This deficiency made them vulnerable to changes in expectations and set in motion in the 1980s a 
devilish interaction between liquidity and solvency crises (Calvo 1988; Calvo et al. 2003; Eichengreen et al. 2005). 
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which focuses on monitoring the national authorities and uses incentives based on punishments of misaligned 
behaviours. This approach generates non-cooperative attitudes and should be replaced by a “broad one” that 
favours the involvement of the actors of the process by enhancing the common identification of interests, 
problems and policies and by using a system of incentives based on prizes and punishments. As had occurred in 
monetary policy in the 1980s, the rigid rules should be replaced by an institutional re-organization able to restore 
flexibility and the effective use of fiscal policy in the area (see Pisani-Ferry 2007; von Hagen, 2004; Wyplosz, 
2005). 
Finally, for several writers (Silbert 2010; De Grauwe 2011a; De Grauwe and Ji 2012; Buiter and Rahbari 
2012; Mohl and Sondermann 2013; Panico and Purificato 2013), the faults of the coordination process and the 
discrepancies in the Treaties have introduced uncertainty as to the mechanisms regulating its working. Under 
these conditions, conflicting national interests have prevailed over those of the whole area in the solution of 
problems. For these authors, macroeconomic imbalances and the false declarations denounced by the newly 
elected Greek government raised the volatility of the interest rates. Yet, the crisis began in May 2010 when 
market operators realised that, owing to conflicting national interests, the European institutions would not 
perform the tasks for which they had been designed. 
There is a large econometric literature supporting both sides of the debate on the causes of the European debt 
crisis. Some authors (de Haan et al. 2014; Gödl and Kleinert 2016) detect an increase in the sensitivity of 
financial markets to the deterioration of fundamentals. Others point out that elements like time-dependent market 
sentiments and herding behaviours have an important bearing on the distress (Dewachter et al., 2015; De Grauwe 
and Ji 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher 2013). Yet, econometric studies of the timing of the crisis are scarce and the 
few works dealing with this topic differ from this paper. Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) and Tamakoshi 
and Hamori (2014) employ a Bai-Perron approach. The former however uses it to examine contagion effects 
during the crisis. The latter, although it tests the existence of structural changes, uses, unlike the present paper, 
monthly data, only consider Greece, and finds one break date in April 2010. Finally, Inoue et al. (2013) check 
the existence of one structural break in a GARCH model of the public bond interest rate of ten European 
countries, while in this paper we search for multiple structural changes applying the approach of Bai and Perron 
(1998). 
The econometric exercises presented in this paper, which examines the sovereign bond markets by 
distinguishing two periods (June 1999–May 2009 and June 2009–June 2014), reach the following results: 
 The first “break date” in the time series occurred on the 10th of May 2010, rather than in Autumn 2009, as 
stated by the first interpretation recalled above. 
 The other break dates took place from October 2011 to August 2012. 
 From June 1999 to May 2009 the movements of the interest rates of the sovereign bonds of Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Spain were highly synchronised. 
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 From June 2009 to June 2014 the close positive connection between the movements of these rates 
significantly weakened in size falling by a factor of two from almost perfect collinearity (0.95, p = 0.000) to a 
much lower level of 0.31. 
 During this second period, the effects of good news on the government bonds’ yields of the latter countries 
became more destabilising than those of bad news. 
 
These results lend support to the second interpretation. They are consistent with the view that up to 2007 
market operators solved the contradictions existing in the Treaties of the Union by assuming that, in the presence 
of speculative attacks, the European institutions would have chosen to defend the citizens from the instability of 
financial markets. They so priced the sovereign bonds in such a way to generate small spreads among their 
yields. The international financial crisis raised the volatility of the interest rates, but the crisis began in May 
2010, when the operators realised that, owing to conflicting national interests, the European institutions were not 
able to perform the tasks for which they were designed. The situation worsened after summer 2011, when the 
European authorities, under the pressures of national interests and disregarding the warnings of the ECB, 
hastened to restructure the Greek sovereign debt and insisted on proposing austerity measures and severe 
punishments for misaligned behaviours to solve the crisis. It improved during summer 2012, when the ECB 
Governing Council approved an effective programme for the purchase of sovereign securities, trying to amend 
one of the fallacies of the institutional organization of EMU. 
The paper is so organised. Section 2 and 3 present the results of the econometric exercises. Section 4 presents 
a chronology of the debt crisis compatible with the outcomes of the previous exercises. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Econometric analysis of structural breaks in sovereign bond yields during the crisis 
Assuming with the literature that changes in financial markets are the result of specific events, we present an 
econometric analysis of the daily time series of the interest rates of the 10-year government bonds of Greece, 
Italy and Spain from January 1999 to June 2014 to identify the existence of “breaks” in their parameters. 
The main part of our analysis focuses on the period June 2009 - June 2014, when the major turbulences in 
European markets for sovereign bonds manifested themselves. The data concerning the previous period will 
however be used to test for the presence of a unit root in the series. This is a preliminary question for our 
econometric analysis because different methods to detect multiple structural breaks should be applied in the case 
of stationary or of time series with a unit root (Aue and Horvath, 2013), with the second analytical context being 
more complex than the first. Moreover, the likely presence of structural changes in time series significantly 
complicates the testing of a unit root.
 5
 Data on the period preceding the crisis offer a way to skip these 
complexities because the European sovereign bonds’ markets were not hit by significant shocks and there is no 
                                                 
5
 Sudden changes in a time series could bias the test towards the acceptance of the stochastic trend hypothesis even when 
the true data generating process is piecewise stationary (Perron, 2006). 
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evidence of structural change in the series of Greece, Italy and Spain from 2000 to 2007. Hence, we test for a 
unit root in the times series of the years 2000-2007, and then assume that the results of the test apply to the 
whole period. What would distinguish the two sub-periods is the presence of break points in the most recent one. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root with a drift in the time series of 10-year government bond yields of Greece, 
Italy and Spain was tested using three methods: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979); the 
test proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) that generalizes the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; the 
Phillips–Perron test (Phillips and Perron, 1988). All these testing procedures gave the same outcome: we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the time series of the three countries contain a unit root. The same result was obtained 
by using the test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Accordingly, in the following we investigate the time 
series of the interest rate on government bonds by assuming that it follows the autoregressive equation: 
 
(1)  𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                  𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇,   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛  
 
where 𝑡 is a time index, 𝑛 is the maximum lag, 𝜇 is a drift parameter, and 𝜀𝑡 is the random disturbance. The 
presence of a unit root in 𝑟 implies the condition: 1 − ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0. Hence, the data generating process (DGP) of  
𝑟𝑡 is characterized by a deterministic trend, with slope coefficient equal to 𝜇, and a stochastic trend. We obtain a 
more convenient equation for the econometric analysis of breaks in the DGP of 𝑟𝑡 writing equation (1) in terms 
of the first difference of bond interest rates, 𝛥𝑟𝑡: 
 
(2)  ∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡 , 
 
where 𝛽𝑖 = − ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1 . 
We then introduce structural changes in equations (1) and (2) by assuming that the parameters 𝜇 and 𝛽𝑖 can 
change because of 𝑚 breaks: 
 
(3)  ∆𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                  𝑡 = 𝑇𝑗−1 + 1, … , 𝑇𝑗, 
 
where 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑚 + 1  denotes the regime, and the convention that 𝑇0 = 0  and 𝑇𝑚+1 = 𝑇  is used. 
According to equation (3) the time series of bond yields can be subject to changes of the drift parameter 𝜇, and 
the passage from one regime to the next occurs gradually as implied by the autoregressive component.  
This econometric model considers two fundamental questions. One is the estimation of the parameters in 
each regime, and the other is the estimation of the unknown break points. We apply the methodology proposed 
by Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) - described in the Appendix - to the daily data of the 10-year government bond 
yields of Greece, Italy and Spain to detect structural change in the period between the 1
st
 of June 2009 and the 
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23
rd
 of June 2014. We focus on this period because it contains some major events associated with the sovereign 
debt crisis in the three countries. 
 
Table 01 – Break dates 
Country Break dates Confidence interval, α=5% 
   
Greece 10/05/2010 29/04/2010 – 09/06/2010 
 
08/11/2011 29/09/2011 – 15/12/2011 
 
13/02/2012 08/02/2012 – 14/02/2012 
 
09/03/2012 08/03/2012 – 14/03/2012 
 
11/05/2012 03/05/2012 – 15/05/2012 
 
 
 
Italy 24/10/2011 10/10/2011 – 27/10/2011 
 
09/11/2011 08/11/2011 – 18/11/2011 
 
25/11/2011 04/11/2011 – 29/11/2011 
 
09/01/2012 02/01/2012 – 18/01/2012 
 
03/02/2012 27/01/2012 – 15/02/2012 
 
30/07/2012 09/05/2012 – 04/12/2012 
 
 
 
Spain 14/11/2011 08/11/2011 – 17/11/2011 
 
02/12/2011 25/11/2011 – 08/12/2011 
 
15/06/2012 13/06/2012 – 25/06/2012 
 
04/07/2012 28/06/2012 – 06/07/2012 
 
02/08/2012 20/07/2012 – 20/08/2012 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
The main interest of our study is to identify the changes of the drift parameter 𝜇  that summarizes the 
deterministic component of the dynamics of the interest rate of sovereign bond in the long run. Yet, the 
autoregressive component of equation (3) also transmits important information on the reaction of financial 
markets. For instance, the short-run dynamics of the interest rates can give some indications on how financial 
operators evaluate new events that change the degree of uncertainty and volatility of the markets. The point 
estimates and confidence intervals of break dates are shown in Table 1, while Table 2 presents the parameters of 
model (3). A glance to the figures displayed in Table 2 reveals some significant differences in the way the three 
countries were affected by financial market speculation that we resume in the following findings. 
 
Finding 2.1. Speculative attacks to Greek public bonds.  
During the examined period Greek bonds were first affected by a sequence of negative events that increased 
the trend of 𝑟𝑡; then by other events that in May 2012 changed the direction of this trend downwards. These 
shocks were accompanied by important changes in the short run dynamics of the interest rate. 
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Table 02 – Parameter estimates of the model (3) for every detected regime. 
Country 
Regime 
(Start date – End date) 
µ β1 β2 β3 β4 
       Greece 01/06/2009 – 09/05/2010 0.028 -0.066 0.127 -1.015 
 
  
(1.469) (-1.152) (1.119) (-8.053) 
 
 
10/05/2010 – 07/11/2011 0.043 0.411 -0.083 -0.080 
 
  
(2.485) (8.269) (-1.915) (-1.981) 
 
 
08/11/2011 – 10 /02/2012 0.120 -0.182 -0.036 0.080 
 
  
(1.535) (-1.529) (-0.303) (0.680) 
 
 
13/02/2012 – 08/03/2012 1.771 -0.566 -1.613 -3.427 
 
  
(2.194) (-1.394) (-4.052) (-7.812) 
 
 
09/03/2012 – 10/5/2012 0.208 -0.012 0.041 0.009 
 
  
(2.356) (-0.558) (1.928) (0.448) 
 
 
11/05/2012 – 23/06/2014 -0.029 0.409 -0.129 -0.016 
 
  
(-2.822) (10.843) (-3.183) (-0.431) 
 
Breusch–Godfrey test: 0.012 P-value: 0.913 
 
       Italy 01/06/2009 – 23/10/2011 0.002 0.216 -0.128 
  
  
(0.821) (5.430) (-3.211) 
  
 
24/10/2011 – 08/11/2011 0.080 -0.626 0.73 
  
  
(1.342) (-2.206) (2.085) 
  
 
09/11/2011 – 24/11/2011 0.044 0.373 -0.618 
  
  
(1.479) (2.826) (-5.437) 
  
 
25/11/2011 – 08/01/2012 -0.003 0.164 0.205 
  
  
(-0.091) (0.937) (1.192) 
  
 
09/01/2012 – 02/02/2012 -0.145 -0.164 -0.699 
  
  
(-5.043) (-0.979) (-4.043) 
  
 
03/02/2012 – 29/07/2012 0.003 0.264 -0.179 
  
  
(0.327) (3.021) (-2.051) 
  
 
30/07/2012 – 23/06/2014 -0.007 -0.055 0.007 
  
  
(-2.149) (-1.220) (0.146) 
  
Breusch–Godfrey test: 0.521 P-value: 0.470 
 
       
Spain 01/06/2009 – 13/11/2011 0.003 0.279 -0.124 -0.040 -0.006 
  
(1.039) (6.983) (-2.986) (-0.960) (-0.148) 
 
14/11/2011 – 01/12/2011 -0.106 0.029 0.685 0.371 0.205 
  
(-3.162) (0.142) (3.444) (1.378) (0.752) 
 
02/12/2011 – 14/06/2012 0.013 0.192 -0.002 -0.105 -0.080 
  
(1.411) (2.372) (-0.021) (-1.303) (-1.034) 
 
15/06/2012 – 03/07/2012 -0.074 -0.154 -0.162 -0.387 -0.851 
  
(-3.411) (-1.191) (-1.433) (-3.627) (-6.828) 
 
04/07/2012 – 01/08/2012 0.003 0.559 0.228 -0.757 0.216 
  
(0.106) (2.863) (1.092) (-3.361) (1.003) 
 
02/08/2012 – 23/06/2014 -0.008 0.271 -0.155 0.135 -0.173 
  
(-2.560) (6.093) (-3.456) (3.021) (-3.975) 
Breusch–Godfrey test: 0.286 P-value: 0.593 
Notes: t statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset. 
 
Finding 2.2. Uncertainty in the market of Italian public bonds. 
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The different regimes showing in the series of the Italian bond rate were generated by events changing both 
the drift and the parameters of short run dynamics. Indeed, in five regimes the parameter 𝜇 is not statistically 
different from zero, while in two regimes the estimate of 𝜇 is significantly negative. In six of the seven regimes 
our estimates detect substantial changes in the parameters of the short run dynamics. One may deem that, during 
periods in which operators were expressing doubts about the credibility of governments’ actions, some negative 
events increased the uncertainty on the sustainability of the Italian public debt. The opposite, which seems more 
in line with the Italian macroeconomics fundamentals, may have occurred when the trend reverted towards lower 
interest rates. 
 
Finding 2.3. Quick response to financial crisis in Spain.  
Interestingly, the case of Spain seems different from the other two countries. Inspection of the time series of 
the Spanish public bonds’ yields (see Figure 1) shows the existence of one sudden increase in the interest rate at 
the end of 2010 (in November the rate increases from 4.07 to 5.52). The approach we use in our estimates does 
not allow us to perceive this phenomenon, which consists of a change in the level of the series. In November 
2011 the drift parameter  of the Spanish bond rate becomes negative. Subsequently, in our estimates the 
deterministic trend takes nil or negative values. The different regimes of the Spanish bond yields are also 
characterized by important changes in the short run dynamics. Favourable events, rather than adverse ones, are 
thus identified by our analysis of the time series of Spanish sovereign bonds. 
 
3. Volatility in sovereign bonds’ yields during the crisis 
During the period considered in this work, while the time series of sovereign bonds’ yields are non-
stationary, with volatility happening in clusters and extreme spikes for Greek, Italian, and Spanish rates, the 
series describing the German rates have mostly experienced a downward trend (Figures 01 and 02). Changing 
interest rates reflect how markets move among investment opportunities and sharp increases in uncertainty may 
lead operators to concentrate their investment on a smaller set of assets that are considered “safe”. This may 
contribute to spread financial panic and crises. Retrospectively, one can relate periods of prolonged or extreme 
volatility to policy measures and to other events that may help interpreting turning points. 
In this section we employ several GARCH models to investigate the volatility of 10-year spreads on Greek, 
Italian, and Spanish bonds using the German bonds as baseline. German public bonds are generally considered a 
valid benchmark for the evaluation of the performance of other European public bonds of the same maturity 
since the former are perceived as virtually risk free. Before the financial crisis there was a close and stable 
relationship between the rates of these bonds. After then, things have changed. 
To investigate some issues related to the nature of the interest rates of the European public bonds we estimate 
a model of the type: 
 
 11 
(4)  ∆𝑟𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑟𝑡
𝐺 + 𝑢𝑡,  with 𝑢𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡) 
 𝜎𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑢𝑡−1
2 + 𝛼2𝜎𝑡−1
2  
 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the interest rate for the i-th country (Greece, Italy, or Spain), 𝑟𝑡
𝐺 is the German interest rate and 𝑢𝑡 
is a random error with a time-varying variance 𝜎𝑡 which follows a GARCH(1,1) process displayed in the second 
line of the equation. The model is estimated separately over two time windows: (1) June 1999–May 2009 and (2) 
June 2009–June 2014. 
 
Figure 02 – Interest rate changes 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
While the estimates over the second time window reflect an unprecedented and largely unexpected financial 
turmoil, the numbers for the first period reflect the long period of financial stability that preceded the 
international financial crisis of 2007-2008, with parameters likely representing the long-run relations between 
the variables of interest. The relevant estimates are reported in the following Table 03 and several interesting 
findings emerge from them. 
 
Finding 3.1. During the first period the Greek, Italian and Spanish interest rates followed closely the 
German ones. 
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The parameter 𝛽1 is close to 1 during the period June 1999–May 2009: this translated into an almost perfect 
one-to-one change in European rates. According to investors, there was a high degree of substitution among 
different sovereign debts. 
 
Table 03 – GARCH(1,1) model 
(Estimation in differences before and after June 2009) 
 
Greece Italy Spain 
 
Before After Before After Before After 
β1 0.951 0.300 0.941 0.274 0.967 0.307 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β0 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.977) (0.177) (0.731) (0.136) (0.954) (0.056) 
α1 0.123 0.839 0.193 0.158 0.243 0.145 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α2 0.884 0.589 0.789 0.861 0.738 0.867 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily change in the level of 10y public bond for each country considered, before and 
after June 2009; p–values in brackets. 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset. 
 
Finding 3.2. The crisis disrupted the close link between the Greek, Italian, Spanish and German interest 
rates. 
During the second period, the linear dependence between the rates dropped by two thirds on average. Other 
European rates still depended positively on the German ones, but the link was significantly weakened in size. 
 
Finding 3.3. During the second period the volatility of Greek bonds increased its sensitivity to unexpected 
shocks. 
The parameter 𝛼1, which reflects how 𝜎𝑡 responds to innovations 𝑢𝑡−1
2 , increased from 0.123 to 0.839: the 
financial crisis seemed to make Greek bonds extremely sensitive to orthogonal shocks; correspondingly, the 
inertial factor 𝛼2 decreases its size from 0.884 to 0.589. These two facts signal an increased unpredictability of 
changes in Greek bond rates. 
 
Finding 3.4. During the second period the volatility of Italian bonds did not change substantially. 
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Italian bonds slightly decreased their sensitivity to orthogonal shocks (from 0.193 to 0.158), with this change 
partly compensated by an increase in 𝛼2 (from 0.789 to 0.861). 
 
Finding 3.5. Spanish bonds decreased their sensitivity to innovations while increasing their dependence on 
past values. 
The GARCH(1,1) model shows that the unpredictability of Spanish bonds diminished after June 2009. 
 
Table 04 – Nelson’s EGARCH model 
(Estimation in differences before and after June 2009) 
 
Greece Italy Spain 
 
Before After Before After Before After 
β1 0.949 0.439 0.941 0.265 0.964 0.266 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
β0 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.037) (1.000) (0.150) (0.423) (0.148) (0.474) 
α1 -0.038 0.139 -0.038 0.111 0.016 0.092 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
α2 0.215 0.697 0.275 0.185 0.220 0.180 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α3 0.986 0.953 0.953 0.989 0.964 0.990 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
α0 -0.078 -0.031 -0.348 -0.045 -0.272 -0.043 
 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily change in the level of 10y public bond for each country considered, before and 
after June 2009; p–values in parentheses. 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset. 
 
Whereas the GARCH model assumes that good and bad news (unexpected shocks) have the same effect on 
variance, it is possible to model the two kinds of shocks as having potentially different impacts. This is 
performed by using a Nelson (1991)’s exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model of the type: 
 
(5)  ∆𝑟𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑟𝑡
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑡, 
  𝑧𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 𝜎𝑡⁄ , 
  ln 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 (|𝑧𝑡−1| − √2 𝜋⁄ ) + 𝛼3 ln 𝜎𝑡−1
2  
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The error term now is modelled according to equation (5), a stochastic process which includes the term 
𝛼1𝑧𝑡−1 : when the estimated value for this parameter is not zero, shocks have asymmetric effects; more 
specifically, when 𝛼1 > 0, positive shocks (good news) generate more volatility than negative shocks (bad 
news). The overall marginal impact of news on volatility is obtained by summing 𝛼1 to 𝛼2. The estimated results 
for the EGARCH(1,1) model are reported in Table 04. An alternative assessment of how innovations change 
volatility can also be obtained using the news impact curves, a graphical device for the conditional variance of 
interest rates on the vertical axis as a function of unexpected shocks to the same variables on the horizontal axis: 
when a shock equals zero on the centre of the x-axis, the corresponding y-axis value displays the unconditional 
variance, whereas, when a shock differs from zero, the corresponding values on the vertical axis display the 
whole conditional variance; finally, as the right arm of the curve significantly differs from the left one, we have 
evidence that positive and negative shocks affect volatility asymmetrically. The news impact curves for the 
interest rates under study are reported in Figure 03. 
 
Figure 03 – News functions 
 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
As previously found for the simpler GARCH(1,1) model, the EGARCH(1,1) results confirm that the interest 
rates of Greece, Italy and Spain sensibly decreased their dependence from the German rate during the period 
June 2009 - June 2014. 
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Finding 3.6. During the first period considered in this analysis (June 1999–May 2009) the effects of shocks 
or news are symmetric. 
The estimated values of 𝛼1 are almost negligible for the period June 1999–May 2009. As displayed in Figure 
03, the news impact curves are symmetric around zero: good (positive) and bad (negative) news have essentially 
the same effect on volatility. While Greece and Italy displayed a very weak asymmetry toward bad news 
(𝛼1 = −0.038), Spain’s rates were weakly more destabilized by good news (𝛼1 = −0.016) than bad news. 
 
Finding 3.7. During the second period the effects of news became asymmetric, with good news being more 
destabilizing than bad news. 
The European debt crisis increases the responsiveness of variance to positive news: in all cases, the estimated 
values for 𝛼1  are of substantive size (ranging from 0.092 to 0.139). Greece testifies this tendency with the 
highest values. The graphical depiction of the news impact curves shows clearly this change from almost 
complete symmetry to marked asymmetry in the responsiveness of variability to news. 
 
Finding 3.8. Greece experienced a substantial increase in the responsiveness to the news, while Italy and 
Spain’s responsiveness remained substantially unchanged. 
Summing the terms 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 of each country and comparing the values of the two periods considered by the 
analysis, we find that Greece experienced the largest increase (from 0.177 to 0.836), while Italy and Spain 
followed similar trends: Italy moved from 0.237 to 0.296, while Spain moved from 0.236 to 0.272. The evidence 
indicates that the events of the second period had disruptive effects on the volatility of the Greek interest rates, 
whereas Italy and Spain, which were exposed to the same events as Greece, did not substantially change the 
degree of volatility of their interest rates during the same period. 
Finally, the graphs related to the GARCH and EGARCH residuals (Appendix B) show their remarkable 
increase in some period. Key events for the evolution of the European crisis, which we will explain in more 
details in the next section, took place close to the peaks of these increases; nevertheless, they not always 
determined a regime-changing as those detected in the previous section. For the moment, we confine our 
econometric analysis only to measure the volatility effects of these events, and, as they can extend their 
influence over long periods, we introduce the following indicator to translate our results based on daily 
observations into a measure for changes in volatility over  periods of twenty days after the event of interest: 
 
(6)  𝐸 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟−𝐸(𝑉𝑎𝑟)
𝐸(𝑉𝑎𝑟)
=
𝑉𝑎𝑟
𝐸(𝑉𝑎𝑟)
− 1 
 
where the numerator is the cumulated error of prediction in a given period of twenty days and the 
denominator is the cumulated expected variance in the same period.  
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This number provides an easily interpretable metric for the error of prediction express as a percentage. The 
value of the indicator E will be closer to zero (E≈0), the better the model predicts volatility. The opposite holds if 
the value of E in absolute terms is distant from zero. What’s more, sudden increases in the absolute values of E 
indicate that some unexpected events significantly impacted on volatility, which calls for an explanation in terms 
of relevant news. The following Table 05 gives an account of the dating of some significant changes in the 
volatility of the time series. 
We will use this metric in the next sections to describe the impact of news and events that have proved 
relevant for the evolution of the debt crisis. 
 
Table 05 – Error in Predicted variance 
 Date Greece Spain Italy 
Staff agreement on the first adjustment programme for Greece  02/05/2010 22,8 435,7 649,5 
Formal approval of the first adjustment programme for Greece 09/05/2010 -24,2 -4,9 56,9 
Announcement by the ECB of the Securities Market Programme 10/05/2010 325,7 699,7 698,1 
Staff agreement on the adjustment programme for Ireland  28/11/2010 132,1 128,1 226,0 
Formal approval of the adjustment programme for Ireland 07/12/2010 670,1 16,9 158,2 
Staff agreement on the adjustment programme for Portugal  03/05/2011 255,1 186,2 342,7 
Formal approval of the adjustment programme for Portugal 17/05/2011 -11,0 -135,5 -11,8 
Support by the European institutions to a partial default for Greece 21/07/2011 179,6 450,9 506,1 
New restrictive measures requested by EC/ECB/IMF to Greece 02/09/2011 44,9 -217,1 -375,5 
Approval of a new round of austerity measures in Greece 12/02/2012 -33,8 -155,0 -150,1 
Formal agreement on the Private Sector Involvement 09/03/2012 -3,8 384,5 298,9 
Speech of Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference 26/07/2012 -24,2 -4,9 56,9 
Note — The figures are the ratio between the cumulated error in predicted variance of the GARCH model over the twenty 
days following a given date and the predicted variance. 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
 
4. A chronology to interpret the evolution of the sovereign debt markets 
4.1. Macroeconomic fundamentals and the evolution of the spreads before the debt crisis 
The analysis of macroeconomic fundamentals shows the existence of large differences among the countries 
hit by speculative attacks. Before 2007 the average annual growth rates of Ireland, Greece and Spain were 
among the highest in the Eurozone; the Italian and Portuguese ones were among the lowest. Ireland enjoyed 
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persistent surpluses in the current account of the balance of payments; Italy showed surpluses and deficits and 
Greece and Spain persistent deficits. As to fiscal behaviour, the European authorities and some literature 
celebrated Ireland and Spain as “virtuous countries”. On the contrary, Greece persistently exceeded the 3% limit 
on the current deficit to GDP ratio set by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), even if its government debt to 
GDP ratio did not increase owing to the rise in the denominator. From 2005, when the European authorities 
reformed the SGP, Greece increased the deficit to GDP ratios and began to pass false information on it to the 
authorities. Its government debt to GDP ratio started to rise. 
In spite of the differences in the fundamentals, the start of EMU generated convergence and correlated 
movements among the interest rates on 10-year government bonds (Section 3: Finding 3.1). The spreads shrunk 
and stabilised, indicating that financial operators were confiding that the European authorities would have 
resolved the gaps existing in the Treaties of the Union by giving priority to the task for which they had been 
created, i.e. defending the citizens from the instability of financial markets. 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial operators selected the German government bonds as a safe 
form of investment. The interest rates on 10-year government bonds began to undergo diverging movements, 
which strengthened the economic and political position of Germany within EMU. From September 2008 the 
interest spreads on 10-year sovereign bonds underwent an upward movement, which became downward in 
March 2009 (Figure 01).
6
 Another upward movement began in October 2009, when a centre-left coalition took 
power in Greece and disclosed the accounting tricks of the previous government. This event raised again the 
spreads,
7
 thus reinforcing the tendency of interest rates to diverge, as shown by our econometric analysis 
(Section 3: Finding 3.2). Yet, it did not change, as the analysis presented in the Section 2 points out, the drift 
parameter of the interest rates’ time series. The first break date in the series shows up on 10 May 2010 (Table 02 
and 03). At this date the drift parameter increases - from 0.028 to 0.043 - and one may resolve that it was around 
that date that the debt crisis began because financial operators changed view on the ability of the authorities to 
control the speculative movements in the sovereign bonds’ markets. 
 
4.2. The start of the European debt crisis 
The previous statement argues against the interpretation in terms of macroeconomic imbalances (MIs) and in 
favour of that in terms of institutional failures (IFs). It makes a case for setting the start of the European debt 
crisis at the date primarily indicated by the latter interpretation, rather than that proposed by the former. To 
further appraise the previous conclusion, let’s consider the events occurred during the second part of 2009 and 
the first months of 2010 in details. 
                                                 
6
 The spread between the Greek and German rates moved from a monthly average of 0.79 in September 2008 to 2.85 in 
March 2009. Then, it fell to 1.21 in August 2009. 
7
 The spread between the Greek and German rates moved from a monthly average of 1.36 in October 2009 to 3.14 in March 
2010. 
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In the second half of 2009 the European authorities thought it was time to abandon the fiscal stimuli 
introduced in December 2008 to counteract the recession and to deal with the crisis by adopting restrictive 
policies.
8
 The change was related to the escalating fiscal imbalances and to the improving economic situation in 
some countries in the second part of 2009. This decision can be seen as an example of the inability of EMU 
institutional organization to cope with asymmetric tendencies within the area. Economic activity in Spain was 
still depressed and the change in fiscal policy amplified the distress of the banking system and collided with the 
interventions of the national government to restructure it. 
The tendency to return to restrictive fiscal policy built up in October 2009, when the newly elected Greek 
government revealed that the previous one had concealed the true dimension of the fiscal deficits. The 
unearthing of false declarations and the drive towards restrictive fiscal policies caused the reaction of the 
agencies that lowered the rating of the sovereign debts of Greece on the 8
th
 and 22
nd
 of December 2009. 
In February 2010 the ECOFIN called on Greece for a detailed report on the measures to be introduced to 
reduce the deficit and approved the content of the report during the meeting held on March 15-16. In spite of 
that, by the end of March the interest rate on the 10-year sovereign bonds started to rise. On April 11 the 
Eurogroup recommended the introduction of a consolidation plan and of an extraordinary mechanism for 
financial support. Yet, the delays and the lack of support of the German authorities, engaged in an electoral 
process in Renania-Westfalia
9
, led to a further rise in the interest rates on the Greek sovereign bonds, which 
increased from the 6.7% on the 11
nd
 of April to 8.8% on the 22
nd
, forcing the Greek government to ask for a 
rescue plan on the 23
rd
 of April. The request was unattended until May 2, when the Eurogroup proposed that the 
other members of the Union approved the proposal of the concession of bilateral loans to Greece under the 
conditions set by an agreed consolidation plan.
10
 In spite of this proposal, the interest rate on the Greek 10 year 
government bonds kept rising, overtaking 12%. During the weekend of 7-9 May, the ECOFIN eventually held an 
“extraordinary” meeting to approve the creation of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and a rescue 
                                                 
8
 In the meeting held on the 12
th
 of December 2008, the European Council adopted the European Economic Recovery Plan, 
a programme of national budgetary stimulus packages prepared by the European Commission (EC). In the fall of 2009, the 
ECOFIN called on the governments to abandon the stimuli to aggregate demand and start a fiscal consolidation. Moreover, 
on the 2
nd
 of December of 2009, the ECOFIN approved an Excessive Deficit Procedure against eight countries of the euro 
area (Belgium, Germany, Holland, Austria, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia) and revised the recommendations and 
the time schedules for the countries (Greece, France, Spain and Ireland) that had already been submitted to these procedures 
(ECB 2009). These events signal the change in the European authorities’ position on the stance of fiscal policy: the 
authorities returned to consider the Stability and Growth Pact essential for the achievement of fiscal equilibrium. 
9
 To oppose the position of those attributing the delays of the German authorities to the elections, Schwarzer (2014, p. 7) 
argues that international issues play a limited role in regional polls. These issues can however be raised during local 
elections against the ruling party, persuading the national government that it is convenient to postpone decisions on them. 
The Chronology of the Greek crisis, published by the Spanish newspaper El Pais, points out that on April 20 the German 
social democratic opposition announced that it will not allow a fast approval of loans to Greece in the Bundestag: the 
interest rate on the Greek 10-year government bonds rose to 8.4%. On April 26 Angela Merkel stated that to receive 
German loans Greece had to accept a more restrictive consolidation plan than that approved by the Eurogroup on April 11. 
The interest rate on the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds reached 11.4%. 
(See  http://www.rtve.es/noticias/20150527/cronologia-crisis-grecia/329528.shtml, accessed on 03 December 2016). 
10
 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100502-%20Eurogroup_statement.pdf., accessed on 03 
December 2016. 
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package for Greece.
11
 The results of the meeting were made public on the 9
th
 of May after the urns in Renania-
Westfalia had closed (see Panico and Purificato, 2013). 
When the market opened on Monday 10 the interest rate on the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds was 12.4%. A 
few hours later it went down to 6.3%, but then it rose again and closed at 7.8%. The quick return of the interest 
rate to 6.3% suggests that the operators had been gambling on the view that the European authorities would not 
have reacted to the speculative attack until the elections in Renania-Westfalia had ended. The subsequent rise of 
the interest rate spells out that the management of the Greek problems and the poor results of the ECOFIN 
meeting were starting to persuade the operators that conflicting national interests were preventing the European 
institutions from carrying out the tasks for which they had been created, i.e. to defend the citizen from the 
instability of financial markets.
12
 
In the face of the poor results of the ECOFIN meeting, the ECB announced, on the 10
th
 of May, the start of 
the Securities Market Programme (SMP), which allowed the purchase of sovereign debt to stabilise the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy disrupted by the speculative attack. The ECB formally deliberated it 
on the 14
th
 of May. Some events related to the introduction of the SMP, namely the criticisms raised by the then 
President of the Bundesbank in a German newspaper the day after its announcement and other similar 
occurrences of the subsequent months (see Panico and Purificato 2013), highlighted the existence of national 
conflicts within the Governing bodies of the ECB. Owing to the procedures chosen, these conflicts were able to 
make the SMP ineffective. It intervened late, when the situation had decayed to such a point as to require 
emergency operations (see Panico and Purificato 2013). 
This set of events supports the interpretation of the European debt crisis in terms of defects of the institutional 
organization. The first break date in the parameters of the time series shows up on May 10, the day after the 
regional elections in Renania-Westfalia and the “extraordinary” ECOFIN meeting. The delays in the decision 
making, the poor results of the meeting and the events related to the introduction of the SMP persuaded the 
operators that conflicting national interests had come to dominate the scene and were preventing the European 
authorities from performing the task for which they had been created. 
 
4.3. The decision to restructure the Greek sovereign debt. 
The analyses of the previous sections point out that from May 2010 to Fall 2011 there were no other breaks in 
the parameters of the time series of Greece, Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, the series show some significant 
increases in volatility in connection with specific events. 
                                                 
11
 The meeting was extraordinary also because the ECOFIN had never held one during a weekend owing to the high cost of 
its organization. 
12
 For Silbert (2010), the decision of some euro-countries to provide financial assistance to Greece was dictated by the 
desire to favour their own banks, which had invested in Greek sovereigns and were heavily involved in the problem. Thus, 
the Treaties’ statement that the European authorities must adopt a supranational perspective when taking decisions did not 
play a significant role. Christodoulakis (2016) and Schwarzer (2014) also propose this standpoint. 
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The ratio between the residual variance and the variance predicted by the model had gone up to 128.1 for 
Spain and to 226.0 for Italy when the staff level agreement on the Irish adjustment programme was reached in 
December 2010. It further jumped to 186.2 and 342.7 respectively for the two countries when the agreement on 
the Portuguese programme was reached in May 2011. These events thus affected the volatility of sovereign 
bonds’ yields, setting off a period of anxiety and disorder in the financial markets. 
In July 2011 the Dutch, French and German authorities, motivated by electoral interests
13
, made declarations 
in favour of an agreement between the government and the credit institutions for a partial reduction of the face 
value of Greek sovereign bonds. The ECB had opposed this solution fearing its negative effects on the 
management of the Greek and other sovereign debts.
14
 Nonetheless, on July 21 the European Council, composed 
of the Heads of State or Government of the European Union, decided to support the so-called “Private Sector 
Involvement” (PSI) in the second adjustment programme for Greece, in the form of a partial write down of the 
face value of the Greek sovereign bonds. 
As the ECB had dreaded, the approval of this resolution raised uncertainty in sovereign debt markets.
15
 The 
operators increasingly lost confidence in the idea that the authorities would have operated in such a way as to 
protect the solvability of government debts. The downfall of this implicit guarantee converted many economic 
and political events in potential sources of tensions. The volatility of the Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds’ 
yields underwent a larger increase than that occurred when the assistance programmes for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were launched: following the statement of the European Council, the ratio between the residual and the 
expected variance reached 450.9 for Spain and 506.1 for Italy (Table 05). Moreover, the shares of the Italian and 
Spanish sovereign debts held by foreign investors fell, the interbank loans to their financial institutions shrank, 
and the Eurosystem had to step in through its TARGET payment system in order to replace the funding of the 
interbank markets, as had happened after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
16 
 
Under these conditions, the deficient results achieved by the restrictive policies proposed by the European 
authorities and the political instability that they were generating raised further tensions in the markets. The 
recognition of the discrepancies between the results predicted by the Greek adjustment programme and those 
actually achieved, the rise of the government debt – GDP ratio of this country, and the request of a partial 
reduction of the face value of its sovereign bonds could be seen as evidence of the inadequacy of the policy 
                                                 
13
 In the Netherlands general elections were held in September. In France, in the face of the presidential elections of July 
2012, President Sarkozy, with the support of the German Chancellor Merkel, was trying to make up for the loss of 
consensus, which the electorate was assigning to the socialist candidate Hollande, by declaring that the private sectors 
responsible for the crisis had to pay for the damage caused. 
14
 President Trichet warned about the consequence of a partial default stating that this event would have raised the volatility 
of the debt markets (ECB 2011a; 2011b) . 
15
 The PSI had a negative impact on banks’ balance sheets (ECB, 2011c, pp. 43) and on the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy (ECB 2012a, p. 59). 
16
 The share of the Italian sovereign debt held by foreign investors fell from 46.2 per cent of June 2011 to 35.8 of June 2012. 
During the same period the Spanish one fell from 39.3 per cent to 29.2. In June 2011 the Italian TARGET balance was a 
positive figure equal to 6 bn. euro. In June 2012 it was -274.3. At the same dates the Spanish TARGET balance were -45.4 
and -408.4 bn. euros respectively. 
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imposed by the European authorities.
17
 The joint mission of EC/ECB/IMF, however, did not change positions 
and left Athens on the 2
nd
 of September, in the context of the fifth review of the first program, requesting the 
introduction of new restrictive measures to stabilize the Greek economy. This event again increased the volatility 
of the Greek sovereign bonds’ yields, with the residual variance equal to 44.9 per cent of the predicted variance 
(Table 5). Moreover, it led the three main rating agencies to downgrade the Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds 
between the 4
th
 and the 18
th
 of October. The first break in the parameters of the Italian interest rates’ series, a 
negative change detected on October 24, can be placed in the context of poor growth perspectives of the 
austerity measures and of the related uncertainty in the political situation. 
Two days later, on October 26, the ECOFIN approved a plan that increased the requirements of own capital 
of the major European banks
18
 and ratified an agreement for the concession of the sixth instalment of the first 
assistance programme to Greece. Moreover, it started the negotiation of the second assistance programme, which 
contained new restrictive measures. 
The request of new restrictive measures led the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou on the 31
st
 of October to 
call for a referendum on the introduction of measures that were opposed by the large majority of the population 
and were causing social distress and political uncertainty. 
The new breaks in the parameters of the interest rates’ series detected by the analyses presented in Section 2 
can be accounted for in this context of high political uncertainty. The first break, dated November 8, was a 
negative shock in the Greek series. It was related to the anxiety that Papandreou’s request of a referendum 
generated among the European institutions, which made strong pressures on the Prime Minister to call it off. On 
the 3
rd
 of November, acting in accordance with these pressures, Papandreou withdrew the referendum and 
announced that he was stepping down to let a new government to be formed. The events of the subsequent days, 
related to the strong reactions to Papandreou’s decisions within his party, further fuelled uncertainty, which was 
at its highest level on the 8
th
 and 9
th
 of November, when the prospect of a national unity government led by 
Lucas Papademos, a former Vice President of the ECB, was refused. Uncertainty faded away during the next 
days when, conforming to the aspirations of European authorities, the national unity government became a 
viable solution and Papademos took power on the 11
th
 of November. 
Meanwhile, the Italian sovereign bonds’ market was showing a tendency to rise. In this context the Prime 
Minister Berlusconi announced his intention to resign. The analysis presented above in section 2 identifies a 
second break date for this country in the form of a positive change on November 9. The drift parameter of the 
time series of the Italian bonds’ yields decreased from 0.08 to 0.044. 
                                                 
17
 For the early years of the European debt crisis, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) find empirical evidence that stronger planned 
fiscal consolidation was negatively related to lower growth than expected; the natural interpretation proposed by the authors 
of this result is that forecasters underestimated the size of the fiscal multipliers. 
18
 The plan raised some capital requirements and imposed to the banks a buffer of own resources to absorb losses coming 
from the holding of the sovereign debt. Moreover, it allowed the banks to ask the financial support of the EFSF in case of 
necessity (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf.). The new measures forced 
five Spanish banks to acquire additional capital. 
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On the 12
th
 of November, Berlusconi did resign and on the 16
th
 the former EU commissioner Mario Monti 
took power as the Prime Minister of a “technical government”. In this case too, the choice was conformed to the 
aspirations of the European authorities. The change of government further reduced the tensions in the markets 
and the two subsequent breaks in the Italian interest rates’ series, two positive changes detected on November 25 
and on the 9
th
 of January 2012, can also be placed in this context of reduced political uncertainty. 
The changes of the Greek and the Italian governments of mid-November calmed down the financial markets 
of these countries, but increased the tensions in the Spanish ones, where the application of the austerity measures 
imposed by the European authorities were progressively worsening the conditions of the economy and of the 
banking system, which was under reconstruction through repeated government interventions
19
 In this 
contradictory context, which again testifies to the inability of the policy coordination process to take account of 
the different needs of the EMU economies, we can place the first break in the interest rates’ series of this country 
on the 14
th
 of November 2011: the drift parameter diminished from 0.003 to -0.106, while the coefficients of the 
lagged variables of the model in equation (3) rose (Table 2). These diverging trends testify to the high short-run 
variability of the Spanish sovereign bonds’ yields. 
During the subsequent days new events generated opposite bearings on the financial turmoil. On the 20
th
 of 
November the centre-right party led by Mariano Rajoy won the Spanish general elections, achieving an absolute 
majority in the Parliament. On the 21
st
 the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB, for its Spanish name 
“Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria”), set up by the Spanish government to restructure and 
recapitalise the banking sector, had to intervene in favour a saving bank called “Caja Valencia”. On the 29th the 
sixth instalment the financial assistance to Greece was eventually conceded calming the tensions and driving 
down the interest rate on the Spanish sovereign debt. The second break in the interest rates’ series, detected on 
the 2
nd
 of December, can be placed in this context. It was a negative shock: the drift parameter rose from -0.106 
to 0.013 and marking a reversal of the trend of the Spanish sovereign bonds’ interest rates. 
Tensions mounted again at the beginning of 2012 on account of the progressively diminishing confidence of 
the international financial markets in the ability of austerity policies to solve the debt crisis. On the 13
th
 of 
January, in spite of the syntonic proximity between the positions of the Italian government and of the European 
authorities and in spite of the strict implementation of austerity measures, Standard and Poor’s again 
downgraded the sovereign debt of this country, together with those of Spain and other seven euro-countries. The 
rating agency justified its decision by explicitly referring to the inability of European institutions and policies to 
provide an adequate response to the crisis. In this context one can place the break date in the Italian interest rates 
                                                 
19
 In May 2010, following the ECOFIN’s requests (fn. 8 above), the Spanish government adopted a set of consolidation 
measures that anticipated some diminutions of government expenditure to be taken during 2010-2011, introduced some 
additional reductions of expenses, and increased the VAT (ECB 2010). In September 2010 the Parliament approved a 
reform of the labour market and in August 2011 that of the pension system. On September 27 it reformed the Constitution in 
order to strengthen the sound operation of the budget of Public Administrations. 
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series, detected on the 3rd February, when sovereign bonds’ returns went back to a non-decreasing path with the 
drift parameter rising to zero (0.003). 
Something similar occurred in Greece where, in spite of the Parliament’s approval of a new round of austerity 
measures demanded by European authorities on the 12th of February. The analyses of the previous sections 
detect a break date, in the form of an increase in the trend of the interest rates series, on the 13th of February (see 
Section 2: Table 2), accompanied by a decrease in the volatility of these rates, as shown by the reduction of ratio 
between the residual and the expected variance (Section 3: Table 05).  
On the 9
th
 of March the Greek Finance Minister announced the good news of a participation rate of 85.5 per 
cent in the PSI. The large majority of private lenders had officially agreed to write down 53.5% of the sovereign 
debt in their hands. The analyses presented in the previous sections detect another break date in the Greek 
interest rate series on the same day: it was a positive shock that reduced the pace at which the interest rates were 
rising, but did not lead to a downward trend (Section 2: Table 2). Based on the result of the PSI, the joint mission 
of EC/ECB/IMF presented a positive report to European institutions that decided to launch the second 
adjustment program for Greece. 
The Greek sovereign bonds’ yields finally began to decline when, in spite of the outcome of the legislative 
elections held on May 6, where no party reached the majority of seats in the Parliament, the major political 
forces declared their firm will to keep Greece within EMU. The analyses presented in the Section 2 above detect 
another break date for the trend of the Greek interest rates’ series on May 11. Starting from that date the trend 
becomes negative, with the drift parameter decreasing from 0.208 to -0.029. 
Following the European authorities on the new lines of the economic governance and on the requirements to 
be imposed on the European banks, the Spanish authorities introduced other measures to stabilise the economy.
20
 
The economic conditions however were not improving. On the contrary, the negative growth rates of two 
successive semesters and the increased deterioration of private debt, particularly in the residential housing sector, 
was making the support of the banking system more and more necessary.
21
 
At the end of April, the provisional conclusions of IMF report on the Spanish banking system (see IMF 2012) 
clarified that one bank, which the report did not identify but later turned out to be “Bankia”, had to strengthen its 
balance sheet and that the government had to increase the amount of resources devoted to the restructuring of the 
                                                 
20
 In November the ECOFIN approved new rules on government budget supervision, reinforcing the Stability and Growth 
Pact and on the 2
nd
 of March 2012 the Council of Europe, composed of the Heads of State or Government of the EU signed 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance of the EMU, known as Fiscal Compact. As to the requirements of the 
banking sector, following the ECOFIN’s approval of a plan to recapitalise the European banks on October 26 (fn. 18 
above), the Spanish authorities imposed new provisions on the banks on February 3, 2012 (RDL 2/2012), raising their needs 
of new funding up to 50 billion euros (ECB 2012b). 
21
 To facilitate its access to the liquidity of the international markets, the Spanish banking system was restructured in 2010 
through the unification of small financial institutions, whose number diminished from 45 to 18. Legislation also imposed 
higher capital requirements foreseeing some support of public capital. This process led to the practical disappearance of the 
“Cajas de ahorro” (Saving Banks). 
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sector. On May 9 the FROB nationalised “Bankia”22 and on May 12, following the recommendations of the IMF, 
the government approved a Decree (RDL 18/2012), which raised the provisions on the real assets inscribed in 
the banks’ balance sheets and imposed a further increase, amounting to 29 bn. euros, in the funds required for 
their recapitalisation.
23
 The amount of resources that the government had to devote to the rescue of “Bankia”, 
while respecting the constraints on the budget imposed by the European authorities, pushed the spread further 
up. Between the end of May and the beginning of June, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded the rating 
of the Spanish debt and the tensions in the markets rose once again. 
On the 9
th
 of June the government expressed to the Eurogroup its intention to activate the procedures for the 
support of the financial sector, but not for full financial assistance.
24
 This event reduced the spread and the break 
date in the interest rates’ series, a positive change detected on the 15th of June, reflects the markets’ pacification 
that it produced. The Spanish government formally asked the procedures for the support of the financial sector 
on the 25
th
 of June. 
During the same days a complex set of new events affected the movements of the interest rates in opposite 
directions. On the one side, Cyprus’s request for full financial assistance at the end of June and the delays and 
the uncertainty on the approval of the European reforms of the banking union and on the German ratification of 
the EMS tended to raise the interest rates. On the other hand, the news coming from the ECOFIN meeting and 
from the Euro area Summit of 28 and 29 June on the EMU’s reforms and on the possibility to use financial 
assistance to directly recapitalise the banks even before the EMS started to operate, induced some optimism in 
the markets and a tendency for the interest rates to move downwards. On the 3
rd
 of July, however, the Finnish 
authorities clarified that the ECOFIN meeting and the Euro area Summit had failed to achieve an agreement on 
these crucial issues generating disappointment among the operators and a tendency for the interest rates to rise. 
Once again, news regarding the faulty functioning of the Euro area’s mechanisms of policy coordination can be 
considered responsible of the new break date in the Spanish interest rates series, detected on the 4
th
 of July. 
 
4.4. The changing role of the ECB in the debt markets. 
By the end of July and the beginning of August 2012, the Italian and Spanish debt crisis evolved towards a 
positive outcome. The two break dates detected by the analyses of the previous sections, on the 30
th
 of July for 
the Italian time series and on the 2
nd
 of August for the Spanish one, are related to the turnaround of the sovereign 
bonds’ yields and of their volatility, which began to decline. The key events were those leading to the 
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 Bankia had been set up in 2010 to foster the integration of the  “Cajas de ahorro”. With the support of public capital it 
rapidly became the fourth larger Spanish financial institution. In 2011 it had access to the Stock Exchange to collect funds. 
The access was however based on untrue accounts, which banking supervision failed to uncover. In May 2012 it was 
nationalised. On that occasion the accounts regarding 2011, which showed a profit of 309 million euros, had to be corrected. 
They had instead to exhibit a loss of 4,369 million euros (Berges and Ontiveiros 2013, p.108). 
23
 On May 25, after reformulating its accounts, Bankia asked the government to provide additional 19 bn. euros for the 
required recapitalisation. 
24
 The Spanish government announced its intention to ask for a 100 billion euros financial support to the banking sector. It 
amounted to approximately 10% of the Spanish GDP. 
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introduction of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) by the ECB. On the 26
th
 of July the President of the 
ECB, Mario Draghi, in the Global Investment Conference held in London stated that ‘within our mandate, the 
ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’ (ECB 2012c). This 
statement clarified that the President of the ECB was determined to defeat the conflicting national interests 
within the governing board and was going to propose new measures in order to fortify the euro. The ECB 
announced the guideline of these measures on the 2
nd
 of August and approved the OMTs on the 6
th
 of September 
(ECB 2012d; 2012e). To guarantee the smooth working of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy the 
programme allows the central bank to make unlimited purchases in the secondary markets of the bonds issued by 
the governments fulfilling the fiscal conditions set by the European authorities. The impact on the sovereign 
bonds’ markets was favourable. 
In response to this commitment by the ECB, the interest rates went rapidly and decidedly down. This 
corroborates the conclusion that during the sovereign debt crisis the increased sensitivity to news (Section 3: 
Finding 3.8) became markedly asymmetric (Section 3: Finding 3.7) especially for Greece, with positive news 
having a stronge r impact than negative news on interest rates’ volatility. This tendency did not manifest itself 
during the first period of persistent stability that preceded the sovereign debt crisis (Section 3: Finding 3.6). The 
different impact of positive news detected by the analysis concerning the second period can be interpreted by 
assuming that financial operators tend to consider a continuation of the euro area more likely than a breakdown. 
 
5. Conclusions 
According to the literature, the two main explanations of the European debt crisis are focused on the 
following factors: first, the macroeconomic imbalances due to mistaken choices of the national governments; 
second, the flaws in the institutional organization that implied an ineffective reaction of European authorities. 
 The previous analysis argues in favour of the latter underlining first that the crisis began in May 2010, when, 
on account of the resistance and delays of the Eurosystem to intervene to defend the smooth working of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the yields of Greek government bonds underwent a break-date in 
their time series and the Spanish and Italian bonds’ yields suffered an increase in the volatility. The analysis has 
then pointed out a second event that further destabilised the sovereign debt markets, increasing the volatility of 
the Spanish and Italian sovereign bonds’ yields. It occurred in July 2011, when the Euro Area leaders decided to 
support the voluntary involvement of the private sector in the second adjustment program for Greece, namely, 
the first partial default of an EMU country. The analysis has thirdly pointed out that, from October 2011 to 
March 2012, in Greece, Spain, and Italy the instability of the sovereign bond markets further increased in spite 
of the fact that new pro-European governments took office and quickly adopted severe packages of austerity 
measures. Fourthly the analysis has shown that in July 2012 the Spanish sovereign bonds’ yields went back to 
rise owing to the failure of the European institutions to achieve an agreement on a set of measures consistent 
with the on-going restructuring of the banking system. The analysis has finally revealed that when the ECB has 
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eventually been able to employ an efficient programme, like the OMTs, to stabilise the sovereign bond markets, 
it has been able to cope with the “destructive” tendencies set in motion by speculation. This case has confirmed 
the result achieved by the analysis that good news generate stronger effects than bad news on the variability of 
the interest rates’ time series. 
These outcomes highlight the need to intervene on the institutional organization of the coordination process 
to stabilise the euro area economy and foster its growth. 
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Appendix A. The Bai-Perron (BP) methodology 
The framework used by Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) for the analysis of multiple structural change is based 
on the objective of the minimization of the sum of squared residuals of equation (3). Indeed, for each sequence 
of break dates we have the function of the parameters (𝜇𝑗 , βi,j): 
(A1)       ∑ ∑ [∆𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑗 − ∑ βi,𝑙Δ𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ]
2𝑇𝑙
𝑡=𝑇𝑙−1+1
𝑚+1
𝑙=1                                   
The minimization of the sum of squared residuals, equation (A1), provides the estimates of the parameters 
(𝜇𝑗 , βi,j), which are function of the particular partition of the period: ?̂?({𝑇𝑗}), ?̂?𝑖({𝑇𝑗}). Substitution of these 
estimates in equation (A1) provides a function of {𝑇𝑗}  that we denote 𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚). Among all possible 
partitions of the period, the optimal break points minimize the sum of squared residuals 𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑚): 
(A2)  (?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑚) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑇1,..,𝑇𝑚𝑆𝑇(𝑇1, … . 𝑇𝑚) 
This problem is constrained by the restriction that the segments between two break points define regimes 
with a minimum length, ℎ. The constraint has a technical justification (BP, 1998; 2003) but is also consistent 
with intuition and econometric practice. In the autoregressive model of equation (3), the BP methodology admits 
different distributions for the random errors across regimes but does not allow for serial correlation.
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The procedure to detect multiple structural changes depends on the number of breaks, 𝑚. An important part 
of the contribution of Bai and Perron (1998) is the proposal of some test statistics for the determination of 𝑚. 
The asymptotic distributions of the tests depend on the trimming parameter that defines the minimum distance 
between two consecutive break dates. Bai and Perron (1998) provide asymptotic critical values via simulations 
assuming the minimum distance between two break points is the 5% of 𝑇, the size of the time series. In our case, 
𝑇 = 1380 and the 5% amounts to 69 observations. When we assumed this value of ℎ, some of the estimated 
break dates occurred at exactly 69 days from the next, meaning that these dates were unreliable. Actually, the 
period under consideration is characterized by significant turbulence. Accordingly, we chose small minimum 
distances between consecutive break dates in our implementation of the Bai-Perron methodology. These are 12 
days for Italy and Spain and 17 days for Greece. To determine the value of 𝑚 we proceeded by using an 
approach based on the assumption made by Bai and Perron (1998) that serial correlation is absent in the error 
term in equation (3). Starting from low values of both the maximum number of breaks, 𝑚, and order of the 
autoregressive model, 𝑛, we increased 𝑚 and 𝑛 until we chose the model whose residuals display the absence of 
serial correlation, tested by the Breusch–Godfrey serial correlation LM test. If the number of breaks in the series 
are greater than the one we assume, the undetected change would be present in the residuals too: the latter would 
signal the presence of other breaks by displaying significant autocorrelation. 
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 The optimization problem just described implies complex computations that Bai and Perron simplify by 
proposing a sequential algorithm based on dynamic programming. We performed all computations using the 
package strucchange, version 1.5-0 (Zeileis et al. 2002) that is a component of the R system for statistical 
computing. 
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Appendix B. The GARCH and EGARCH residuals 
Table B1 – GARCH and EGARCH residuals 
  
  
  
  
 
 
Note – Each graph uses a different scale on the y-axis in 
order to allow a more clear visual inspection of the changes 
in the GARCH and EGARCH residuals. 
Source: Our elaborations on Trading Economics dataset 
 
